For Upcoming PF Tutorials, We Welcome Your Questions

© 2025 Peter N. M. Hansteen

A good tutorial should sound to passersby much like an intense but amicable discussion between colleagues.

In a little over a month, I'll be heading out to Ottawa to attend BSDCan 2025, to help run the conference and to give this year's Network Management with the OpenBSD Packet Filter Toolset tutorial, with my co-presenters Max Stucchi and Tom Smyth.

I've been a regular at BSDCan since 2006, attending every year since except 2008 -- I wanted to go that year too, but other business (actually the business of getting out of a company I'd helped build) kept blocking my preparations even though I had a fresh book out with the first edition of The Book of PF published late 2007. The most recent edition, the third, is available from here and from other good book sources.

Note: This piece is also available without trackers but classic formatting only here.

But I've kept coming back after that, and I've almost always given the PF tutorial at BSDCan, this year again there is a PF tutorial, Network Management with the OpenBSD Packet Filter Toolset, which is likely to follow the format from the previous years.

The format of the session is a sequence of short, intensive lectures interspersed with lab excercises. You can get a reasonable idea of what to expect by looking at the slides from the last sesssion. It can be worth noting that future updated versions of the slides will be available in the same location.

But we're still weeks away from the session, and we are in the period of time when we are making revisions and adjustments. So this is a good time to tell us what topics you would like to see us cover in the next session.

If you have one or more questions or suggestions, please do send them on to us at questions@pftutorial.net, preferably after taking a peek at the slides from the last sesssion.

We will consider each carefully, and if your question or suggestion turns into a new or changed topic, we will give credit where credit is due.

We are looking forward to seeing you in Ottawa in June!

Check out the BSDCan 2025 site for more information on the conference.

If you are unable to attend BSDCan, all is not lost: the EuroBSDcon 2025 conference is still accepting submissions for papers and tutorials, so if you have an interesting BSD-related topic you want the world to know about, your submissions will be welcome at the EuroBSDcon submissions system, where the deadline is 2025-06-21, or June 21st, 2025 (full disclosure: I'm on the program committee). This year's conference is set in beautiful Zagreb, Croatia in late September.

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You might also enjoy

A Few of My Favorite Things About The OpenBSD Packet Filter Tools (2022)
The Hail Mary Cloud And The Lessons Learned (2013 - 2024)
What every IT person needs to know about OpenBSD (2021)

No Project Is an Island: Why You Need SBOMs and Dependency Management

© 2025 Peter N. M. Hansteen

The system you develop and maintain does not exist in isolation. Providing SBOMs for our work is our way to show we care.

Software is a relatively recent phenomenon. For a long time, you could credibly say most of its existence, software was poorly understood by society and industry at large.

There was a time -- and I am old enough to remember that time -- when software was considered a minor but necessary component in IT deliveries. That perception changed over time, and during recent decades it is no longer in doubt that the software industry is just that, an industry in its own right.

Note: This piece is also available without trackers but classic formatting only here.

What we did not have at all until recently was a set of formal requirements to verifiably show what it is we deliver.

In other fields, the term Bill of Materials, or BOM for short, is a familiar term. The Bill of Materials is a document or set of documents that lists all component parts of a delivery.

This is the kind of document that becomes crucial in contexts where the procuring organization is geared toward accounting for everything and auditing when the supplier least expects it.

One such context could be when your organization has landed a contract to supply a backhoe, an armored personnel carrier or even a ship, and the contract requires you to specify component materials used, down to the nuts and bolts level.

Your delivery would not be considered complete without the Bill of Materials or Manifest.

As an aside, it is likely worth noting that the US Department of Defense's need for structured text markup in processing inventory information such as bills of materials was one of the more important drivers, albeit not the only one, behind the creation of SGML, the direct precursor to HTML and XML.

For physical deliveries to organizations of some stature, a Bill of Materials has been a standard part of the process across industries as an important part of quality assurance and a fundamental part of maintenance processes.

Software, on the other hand, has traditionally not been subject to that kind of scrutiny.

Until software that made critical infrastructure work broke, that is.

During the twenty-tens and -teens, we had several incidents where software bugs were tickled enough to lead to costly and embarrasing episodes, and the powers that be (the kind wearing suits) discovered that software was indeed something they needed to care about.

These episodes spurred several things, one being memes like

(XKCD #2347, please also read the explainer), which lead to the common belief that supply chain management and the subtopic dependency management is mainly a problem that concerns open source software.

This assertion is simply not true, in that no project is an island.

Whether you let others see the code you wrote nor not, the software does not exist in isolation.

All software has dependencies, and in the open source world this fact has been treated as a truth out in the open. Every free operating system, and in fact most modern-ish programming languages come with a package system to install software and to track and handle the web of depenencies, and you are supposed to use the corresponding package manager for the bulk of maintenance tasks.

So when the security relevant incidents hit, the open source world was fairly well stocked with code that did almost all the things that were needed for producing what became known as Software Bill of Materials, or SBOM for short.

So what would a Software Bill of Materials even look like?

Obviously nuts and bots would not be involved, but items such as the source code files in your project, any libraries or tools needed to build the thing would be nice-to-knows, and once you have the thing built, what other things -- libraries, suites of utilities, services that are required to be running or other software frameworks of any kind -- that are required in order to have the thing run are obvious items of interest.

So basically, any item your code would need comes out as a dependency, and you will find that your code has both build time and run time dependencies.

Those terms will be quite familiar to users and the developers of the package manager systems for the various open source operating systems. The very same items you would recognize from a listing of package dependencies in a package management tool will turn up in our Software Bill of Materials too. Depending on the specific tool and options you use, the SBOM could contain additional information that may not be entirely relevant in a package manager context.

Under any circumstances, with package systems in place, and even vulnerability scanners available to scan for unsecure code at rest or while running, the free and open source software communities were in fact well positioned for the legal requirements when they hit, and the lessons learned from package management came in quite useful in meeting and satisfying the updated requirements.

Several pieces of legislation emerged from the at times panic flavored fallout from the security incidents. Which ones are more relevant to you will become clear as we move on.

Depending on what parts of the world you care more about, the emphasis will either be on US Executive Order 14028 of May 12, 2021, Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity and its summaries found at the Software Bill of Materials Home page hosted by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, or for the EU and our neighborhood, the EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) with slightly less hardcore legalese available at the Cyber Resilience Act start page.

So that's our backdrop for now. The name of the SBOM game is compliance with those legal requirements, and to not only generate the information -- that's the relatively easy part -- but also to present the information in a way that is understandable and actionable to stakeholders who are not themselves software developers.

The information is there in our code, and with development tools and code scanners a developer is well placed to poke around.

The next challenge it to take that information and present it in a way that conforms with the legal specification and is presented in a way that is usable for stakeholders that are not developers.

In addition to module or package names and versions, the expected SBOM product will typically include information on any identified security problems such as CVEs and a specification of the licenses that apply to each of the identified dependencies.

Thanks in large measure to the open source heritage of the specifications and tools, both of the commonly used SBOM specifications (SPDX and CycloneDX) consider information on licenses used in a file or project as tagging and tracking relevant items, and the tools we describe have some measure of support for tracking and reporting on licenses in use. This can be useful for flagging licenses that may be mutually incompatible or even incompatible with your organization's business goals.

As I hinted at earlier, there are tools available for all of this. If you want to go on and explore for yourself, I would recommend going to the awesome-sbom site, which offers a curated collection of SBOM resources and tools hosted as a Github rego.

There are a large number of tools available, with varying feature sets. In addition to the free tools you find via that collection, several tool suites exist that are exclusively commercial or with free trial or reduced features set versions out with full features available only to paying customers.

The tool set I found the most accessible for my poking around was the combination of syft for generating SBOMs and bomber for display and presentation. The home pages for both are linked from the awesome-sbom collection.

As you can see from that page, there are several SBOM formats around, and to some extent standardization and interoperability efforts are under way. But enough of that, let's look at the actual tools in use.

As a first step, it is instructive to point syft at the base directory of your project and see if it can tell you something you did not know already. syft supports a number of output formats, so if XML is the more readable format to you,

$ syft . -s all-layers -o cyclonedx-xml | xq

will give you pretty-printed XML (assuming you have xq installed) output of what syft found out. Do explore the various command line options for extracting various information about your project.

If you prefer JSON over XML, something like

$ syft . -s all-layers -o cyclonedx-json | jq

will give you readable JSON of the same information. Again, there are a number of options to explore.

When you have explored a bit, you may want to look into how you incorporate these tools in your project and make the SBOM a build artifact.

The bomber documentation has this example suggestion for inclusion in a CI/CD pipeline:

# Make sure you include the - character at the end of the command. This triggers bomber to read from STDIN
syft packages . -o cyclonedx-json | bomber scan --provider ossindex --output json -

In a real world scenario, I could imagine that non-developers would appreciate it if you supplement that line with one using the --output=html option. The HTML output provides a report that lists licenses involved before listing know vulnerabilites by severity and assigned CVE.

While I was writing this article, a colleague who had been reviewing it told me of an episode that shows that even extremely basic use of the SBOM tools can be useful. A customer had called, saying they needed a complete list of tools and dependencies involved in a project, and right away. As a first step, my colleague cd'ed in to the main directory of one of the subprojects for that customer, and issued the command

$ cdxgen .

and was rewarded with a bom.json file that listed somewhere in excess of three hundred dependencies for that relatively minor subproject alone. The customer was suitably impressed and granted my colleague a more realistic and less immediate time frame for submitting the full dependency tree.

More SBOM-savvy co-stakeholders in your project may even be capable of processing your json or xml formatted SBOMs themselves, using tools of their choice.

Your project and customer may already have chosen a different toolset, or you may find that some other SBOM generating and presentation tool set are better matches for your requirements.

It is in fact conceivable that you have SBOM-capable tools within reach in your environment already. The fairly popular images-and-sundry repository system Harbor supports automatic SBOM generation on image push by hooking in trivy for image scanning duty, should you choose to enable that feature for your Harbor hosted projects.

If you want to explore further, please dive into the resource references at the end here.

For the more Bill of Materials savvy developers who want to explore even more, it may be of interest that the OWASP and SPDX teams are working on more specialized BOM variants, including OBOM (Operating system Bill of Materials), SaaSBOM (Software as a Service Bill of Materials), CBOM (Cryptography Bill of Materials), and several more. Again, see the referenced resources at the end here and follow the breadcrumbs.

SBOM Resources

The Software Bill of Materials home page at NTIA is the mother ship of SBOM documentation

Browse OWASP CycloneDX for all things about the CycloneDX specification and related tools, also their CycloneDX tool center

Browse the System Package Data Exchange specification (SPDX) for all things SPDX (supported by the Linux Foundation), including copious linked reference material

awesome-sbom is a curated list of SBOM tools and resources

EU residents will want to poke around the Cyber Resilience Act site for reference

Brewing Transparency: How OWASP's TEA Is Revolutionizing Software Supply Chains is a summary of recent work on OWASP Transparency Exchange API (TEA)

SBOM buyer’s guide: 8 top software bill of materials tools to consider is a readable overview of (some) SBOM tools

Olle Johansson's FOSDEM presentations are among several good SBOM talks at that conference (search the site for more)

Peter N. M. Hansteen: Open Source in Enterprise Environments - Where Are We Now and What Is Our Way Forward? (2022, also here) has some insights on how open source software plays a crucial role in enterprise environments and elsewhere

No Project Is an Island: Why You Need SBOMs and Dependency Management is this article (also here)

A Suitably Bizarre Start of the Year 2025

© 2025 Peter N. M. Hansteen

Already somewhat blasé from life in the honeypots, yours truly registers an even more bizarre level of events after a some routine logs spelunking

If you're reading this soon after the piece is published, 2025 is a fresh new year, and I would like to wish you all the best for the year ahead.

Then I want to relate what happened here (or rather at the Internet facing network interface of the server in question) during the initial few hours of the new year 2025.

Note: This piece is also available without trackers but classic formatting only here.

If you are a returning reader, you will be familiar with my ongoing experiment and studies of Internet miscreants and how to thwart their efforts as effectively as possible while expending no more than absolutely necessary in terms of time or energy on our end. Central to those efforts are the greytrapping based blocklist and the ever-growing list of spamtraps, which late in 2024 passed the half a million mark, right now numbering 568212 entries of known bad, not deliverable email addresses in our domains (almost certain to have increased by the time you read this).

I have written about the daily maintenance tasks for the lists, such as they are, in previous entries such as the list homepage pointed to in the previous paragraph and the traplist ethics page as well as the blog post Goodness, Enumerated by Robots. Or, Handling Those Who Do Not Play Well With Greylisting (November 2018, also here) or for that matter the piece I wrote about the arrival of the three hundred thousandth spamtrap, The Things Spammers Believe - A Tale of 300,000 Imaginary Friends (also here).

All of those pieces show that the original emphasis was to keep the working environment sane for the local users, and the fact that I could generate resources that I could make available for others to use was really just a byproduct of that work, while of course a welcome one for its users.

After some years, and certainly around the time the list of spamtraps had reached the hundreds of thousands, the "salt the mine and poison the well" part (the fourth principle listed on the ethics page) part had subtly slid more into central focus, and I was adding incrementally to my arsenal of scripts and one-liners to expand the list of "imaginary friends" as I came to think of new angles.

Most of these would involve fishing out potential local parts to (the parts before the '@') from the din of spamd log entries. Some of these are hinted at in Harvesting the Noise While it's Fresh, Revisited (also here).

The pace of growth for the spamtraps list did pick up as a consequence, and as I reported in a fediverse post, the total made the half millon mark at some point in December of 2024.

Part of the updating procedure is to search logs for addresses not already in the spamtraps list. One of the things I tend to do after extracting the list of addresses somebot tried to deliver to and that we have not been included already in the spamtraps is to extract the log entries involving those supposedly new addresses for further processing. The output from that grep centered one liner from the overnight run taken during the late morning of January 1st, 2025 can be found here.

Take a few moments to look at that one if you want.

You will be looking at the output of a series of grep searches for destination addresses.

The bulk of the data shows that hosts not in our local networks tried to deliver largish numbers of messages to third party domains such as qq.com and gmail.com, using our spamtrap addresses as the purported sender addresses, only of course to be added to the set of greytrapped addresses.

Making up addresses in other people's domains to use as From or Reply-to addresses on your spam messages is not a new thing, of course, as long as you do not care to get any feedback on what actually happened with those attempted deliveries.

What baffled me more than a little was that the addresses were apparently used in the exact sequence they would have been found at this site after a fairly recent update run.

Apart from the sheer number of addresses and their freshness, the only item of interest was that behind each of the IP addresses involved there appears to be a number of hosts -- likely virtual machines -- with distinct identifiers in their HELO/EHLO sequence, likely generated strings of a handful of characters such AXBPvDt.

These quasi-random, generated IDs were of course soon made into local parts for new spamtraps. As would, at times some other items it is possible to extract from logs with common unix commands.

So as a start to the new year, this was surprisingly fitting. The general insanity we have seen in this particular field continues, but appears to have reached a new level at the tail end of the tumultous year just past, possibly heading for new levels still.

Good night and good luck.

Addendum 2025-01-13

For those so inclined, it is perhaps worth noting that after a bit of pondering some time after writing this other piece (also here), I started looking at extracting other items from the spamd logs log entries.

I ended up with extracting the local parts for new spamtraps from the purported sender addreses of entries for trapped delivery attempts some time mid-2024. This made for a significant increase in the number of new imaginary friends, and by the final months of that year I had also started extracting similarly from the string offered by the spam senders as their host name in the EHLO/HELO exchange, which of course swelled the population further.

The effect is clearly to be seen in the file that records the number of spamtraps added per year, updated via trivial scriptery roughly daily.

I hope this article and its addenda helps inspire others in our efforts of green cybercrime prevention by giving the actually intelligent detection methods less work to do.

Addendum 2025-03-20

Only a couple of weeks after the previous addendum was written, it was outdated. Due to some trivial resource restraints lead do a slightly different organization of the log data, now as per year files up to and including 2024, and per month from 2025 onwards, in this directory, while the main traplist page still has the list of spamtraps itself in one piece.

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Upcoming Events to watch for:
BSDCan 2025 June 11 through June 14th 2025, in Ottawa, Canada. The Call for papers is active, with February 12 2025 as the deadline for submissions.

EuroBSDCon 2025 September 25-28, 2025 in Zagreb, Croatia.

Nesten all phishing-trening for sluttbrukere har feil utgangspunkt

© 2024 Peter N. M. Hansteen

Mange av de såkalte opplæringsprogrammene om phishing og annet med epost er tilnærmet ren støy, og det finnes mer produktive tilnærminger.

Mange av de såkalte opplæringsprogrammene om phishing og annet med epost er tilnærmet ren støy, og hele konseptet har etter mitt hode totalt kontraproduktiv tenking som utgangspunkt.

Merk: Denne artikkelen er også tilgjengelig uten sporing men bare klassisk formatering her.

Til det første - når det dukker opp en melding som har å gjøre med min ikke-eksisterende bil og parkering i en by der bedriften har et kontor jeg aldri har vært innom, så er resultatet nokså opplagt, da gidder jeg selvfølgelig ikke annet enn å gjøre slikt man gjør med spam som av inkompetansegrunner kommer forbi Exchange-serveren og tilhørende woodoo og lander i en innboks.

Men som sagt er utgangspunktet feil.

Problemet er at brukere på alle nivåer i alle organisasjoner har blitt lært opp til at grafisk støy er en nødvendig del av epost. Det er nemlig innhold med grafisk innhold og HTML-elementer som gir størst potensiale for å overføre og skjule ondsinnet innhold av alle slag. Om en holder grafisk innhold i meldinger til et minimum, utsetter en automatisk andre for mindre risiko ved bruk av epost.

Den produktive tilnærmingen ville være å lære opp brukere, spesielt de med lite teknisk bakgrunn, til å la være å sende meldinger med "rik tekst" i alle tilfeller der det ikke er helt nødvendig. I tillegg må også "ikke-tekniske" brukere faktisk få såpass grunnopplæring i verktøyene de bruker at de blir satt i stand til å forstå ramsen av "Received:"-headere som vises bare de klarer finne alternativet for det i den ÅH SÅ GRAFISKE mailklienten.

Det er mye annet en kunne si om uvettig bruk og oppsett av epost, men det kan vi la være her (interesserte finner mye av mine rants -- hovedsakelig på engelsk -- om slikt og beslektet via profilen min).

Dette er min reaksjon på en post på LinkedIn, men teksten var for lang til å være en kommentar i det mediet.

You Have Installed OpenBSD. Now For The Daily Tasks.

Despite some persistent rumors, installing OpenBSD is both quick and easy on most not too exotic hardware. But once the thing is installed, what is daily life with the most secure free operating system like?

Welcome to OpenBSD! I assume you are reading this as a new user who has just completed installing the system. If you are more experienced with the system and reading because you want to see what they're teaching the young ones these days, you are welcome here, too. And at any rate, input such as corrections and comments are always welcome.

But first, for the really impatient, here are the main points we cover in this piece:

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TL;DR: Supported Releases and Five Commands You Need To Know

• OpenBSD has two releases per year, May 1st and November 1st (roughly). Only the two most recent releases are supported.
• The first command to run after a new install is syspatch, which pulls in any security updates and installs them. If the output indicates a reboot or other action is needed, do as the program says.
• OpenBSD's sudo replacement doas is in base, is easy to set up and use and likely fills your needs for privilege elevation.
• Third party software comes in packages. Use pkg_add to install packages. For finding packages, openbsd.app might help.
• When you need to upgrade to a new release, sysupgrade does the job well in almost all cases.
• For managing services (if you need to), rcctl is there for you to get things done.
• Please keep yourself up to date on developments, and keep the length or limit of the support period for your release in mind. Also, we will offer some insight on running -current at the end.

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Installing OpenBSD is quite straightforward on most hardware (possibly excluding some true antiques and, occasionally. the newest of the new). In the rest of this article we will assume that you have completed a basic install, following the OpenBSD Installation Guide in the OpenBSD FAQ, possibly supplemented by other sources.

In our experience, following the FAQ's instructions should get you there, and keep in mind that the defaults are sane, and it is not entirely unheard of that the interactions with the installer consist almost entirely of pressing the Enter key in response to the prompts with suggested default values. And if you have not read the afterboot(8) man page, now is likely a good time to give it at least a glance.

Note: This piece is also available without trackers but classic formatting only here.

Planning Ahead: One Release Every Six Months, The Two Most Recent Releases Are Supported

When you start poking around OpenBSD and learning how things are done, it is important to keep in mind that

• The OpenBSD project makes two releases a year, with release dates normally falling on or around May 1st and November 1st.
• The project offers security updates to the base system and packages for supported releases, currently the two most recent ones. See the FAQ item about OpenBSD flavors for further explanation.
• Support is available primarily through the project mailing lists. In addition, user groups and commercial (paid) support options are available in several locations.

This means that there is no such thing as an OpenBSD Long Term Support (LTS) release, you are actually expected to upgrade to a supported version at least once a year.

At the time of this writing (late April 2025), the supported releases are OpenBSD 7.6, which was released on October 8th, 2024, and the most recent release OpenBSD 7.7, released April 28th, 2025. Once OpenBSD 7.8 becomes available (the link will start working some time before the event), OpenBSD 7.6 support stops, and you need to move on to a supported release.

So once you are past the initial experimental phase, please start planning for how to maintain your systems. You will not regret doing those preparations down the road.

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Protip: Before starting anything that produces output that likely scrolls off the top of your screen or window, start a script session so all visible events are preserved in the file you specify. See man script for details.

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Your First Move After Install: Run syspatch

There you are, with a fresh install of a still supported release of OpenBSD.

The first thing to do is to check whether any security updates (patches) are available. The easiest way to check is to choose the Patches link from the main OpenBSD website. If you installed your release close enough to the release date, there may be no patches available yet, but you can rest assured that over the lifetime of a release, there will be some. Towards the end of their lifetimes some releases have seen twenty or more updates.

If you are on one of the more common platforms (amd64, arm64 or i386), you could even skip the manual check and let syspatch do the job for you (for the other 11 platforms, the old fashioned patch and make process, managed and verified via signify still applies, see the contents of each patch file).

To run the initial syspatch on a new system, log on with the user you created during the install process, then su to root, and run syspatch with no arguments.

If you have Internet connectivity and there are installable patches available, the command lists them as they are fetched and applied.

If no patches are available, the command exits quietly.

If the messages from syspatch or the patch description indicate that one or more services have been updated, make sure to restart those services to ensure that only the updated binary is loaded and running.

If the messages from syspatch or the patch description indicates that a reboot is required, please do reboot your system before proceeding. In that case, a shutdown -r now is likely appropriate before you go to the next steps.

For Administrative Tasks, doas Likely Fills Your Needs

With all available security in place for your OpenBSD base system, you more likely than not have a few more system administration tasks queued up, such as installing packages.

Performing those tasks require elevated privileges, so logging on as root may seem tempting. Please resist that temptation. It is much better if you only run with higher privileges when the situation actually requires it, and the OpenBSD base system has doas available for that purpose.

OpenBSD, like most of the Unixlikes around, used to rely on sudo for going to higher privileges, but feature creep happened over the years, and by the time OpenBSD 5.8 was released, we had doas available for "about 95% of the things people actually use".

Out of the box, doas comes almost ready to use.

As the man page hints, the command will only work with a valid /etc/doas.conf in place.

Fortunately, the configuration file man page offers an example that is a reasonable starting point. If you do cut and paste that one, please replace the user names aja and tedu with something appropriate for your local environment.

Simpler and more specific configations are available, but even with those minimal edits, you will no longer need to log in as root or su to root to get things done.

Remove the Tedium From Services Management With rcctl

If your only OpenBSD system is your laptop, you probably do not need to worry about managing services at all. By default, a clean install runs no services.

The installer offered the option of enabling sshd for you, but accepting the offer is not actually a requirement. If you want to enable or otherwise manage services after install, you can get a lot done with rcctl, including enable, disable, start, stop, restart services and even set a service's parameters.

In short, you can get most of the operations you would need on your rc.conf.local file that you would imagine would require a text editor and perhaps a variety of kill commands done by targeted use of rcctl instead. Take a peek at the rcctl man page -- it's short, but useful and friendly.

For Anything Not In Base, Look to Packages with pkg_add and Other pkg_* Tools

A fresh OpenBSD install is a surprisingly full featured operating system. If you specified during install that you would be running the X windowing system, the system will offer a graphical login screen and present you with the fvwm window manager.

However, the default window manager may be perceived as too basic for some tastes, and in a typical end user scenario, you would typically want at least

• A desktop environment
• A web browser
• A suite of office software

This is where the OpenBSD ports and packages system comes into play. For installing packages, the tool you want to use is pkg_add (for some background and examples of how to use the ports and packages system, see my earlier piece You've Installed It. Now What? Packages!, also available prettified and tracked here).

The OpenBSD packages collection offers several options for all three categories, and a common combination is
xfce for desktop environment,
firefox for web browsing and
libreoffice for the office suite.

For package installs on OpenBSD, the general procedure is,

find the package name (your guess is likely right or quite close),
run pkg_add packagename,
read any message the command outputs at the end, and follow the steps indicated.

If the package install outputs instructions, you will likely also find the instructions in /usr/local/share/doc/pkg-readmes/packagename, but the earlier advice to run anything important in a script session applies here too.

So in our desktop scenario the sequence would be

$ doas pkg_add xfce
follow the instructions the package message prints. You may need to log out and back in after this step (and yes, you can have each user specify their own separate destop environment).

$ doas pkg_add firefox
follow the instructions the package message prints.

$ doas pkg_add libreoffice
follow the instructions the package message prints.

At this point, the packages you installed are ready to use, and you can browse the web and read and produce office documents to your heart's content. If you want a mail client too, several of the well known ones are available as packages. A simple pkg_add thunderbird will add one of the more popular ones to your set of locally installed software.

If you want to find further packages, the You've Installed It. Now What? Packages! article offers some pointers. If you do not want to install a full ports tree for search purposes only, the openbsd.app website offers a nice clickable interface.

Keeping Up to Date: Keep Running syspatch and pkg_add -u

Keeping an OpenBSD system updated is not difficult. You have already seen syspatch in action for pulling in security or reliability updates.

Over the lifetime of a -stable version of the release (which is what your system turns into after your first syspatch), more updates will inevitably become available, and you (your system administrator) should periodically check for any updates and install them in due course.

One useful way to automate the process is to set a cron job that runs syspatch -c (see the syspatch and crontab man pages) at reasonable intervals and mails the output to somebody relevant.

If you run several systems or even more than one OpenBSD version, you would be well advised to appoint one machine per version to be the syspatch canary in order to keep the noise level in your mailboxes or other alerts channels down to reasonable levels.

For keeping installed packages up to date, the command to use is pkg_add with the -u (update) flag.

The pkg_add command offers several other flags that affect its behavior, but the only ones of any real use in a production (stable) environment are the -v (verbose) and -m (print progress bars) options.

If the messages from pkg_add indicate that one or more services have been updated, make sure to restart those services to ensure that only the updated binaries are loaded and running.

At this point, you should have all the pieces in place for keeping your OpenBSD-stable systems in trim with the latest available fixes. Keep up with updates, and you should be OK for the supported lifetime of the code.

Jumping to the Next Release with sysupgrade

All good things come to an end eventually, and when a new release is available, or at the latest, when your present operating system is coming close to end of its supported life, it becomes necessary to upgrade to the next, newer release.

Fortunately, recent OpenBSD versions (since OpenBSD 6.6, in fact - released November 17th 2019), offers a command that offer a smooth upgrade for the most likely scenarios, called sysupgrade.

The sysupgrade command is designed to handle the somewhat complex upgrade process (see the earlier article Keeping Your OpenBSD System In Trim: A Works For Me Guide for some background -- also available tracked and prettified) with minimal user interaction.

The command is designed on the premise that the system to be upgraded is very close to a default install -- if you keep yourself with custom kernels or left out any of the default install sets during install, you are not part of the target audience, and you will be better served by the article referenced in the previous paragraph.

Before proceeding to upgrading to a new release, it is advisable to read the release notes for the new release to identify any changes that may require extra attention. Fortunately, the occasions when manual intervention is strictly needed are rare between releases.

When a new release is available, you upgrade to the next release (numbered by increments of 0.1 per convention) by running

$ doas sysupgrade

The command fetches the install sets for the new release, reboots into the installer, runs sysmerge to perform any needed updates to configuration files and reboots into the upgraded system.

If the sysmerge pass detects any changes that are beyond its automated capability, it will issue a warning that a manual sysmerge is needed. In most cases this will not be needed, however.

When you have the base system upgraded, you will likely want to upgrade to newer versions of any installed packages as well. The command needed is the same as the one you used previously to pull in packages with updates for any identified issues:

$ doas pkg_add -u

When upgrading packages after a system upgrade it is worth paying attention to any package messages and to check for any updates to the package readmes in the /usr/local/share/doc/pkg-readmes/ directory.

Once you have started upgrading packages (if not earlier) you will want to explore other package tools. Try apropos pkg for pointers on where to start exploring.

If you run into any problems, the support channels mentioned earlier in this piece will offer help in response to any reasonably formulated problem reports.

Ready For -current? The Same Tools, Used Slightly Differently

When you have been running OpenBSD stable versions for a while, you may be tempted to explore a bit further, and perhaps even be involved in developing the systems or packages or testing any new features or changes that will become available in upcoming releases.

This is when you may want to explore OpenBSD-current. The way in is to install a snapshot (from the snapshots directory on your favorite mirror). Just how to proceed is really up to you, but if you jump to running -current, you will probably make your life easier in debugging and development contexts if you keep fresh cvs checkout of the src and xenocara source trees as well as the ports tree.

Once you are running a snapshot, the maintenance and upgrade procedure changes slightly. As mentioned, it is advisable to keep sources and ports up to date (start with reading the Building the System from Source part of the FAQ).

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Note: Keep in mind that snapshots track -current, and generally switch to post-release code some time before the release becomes available. At that point, upgrading from a snapshot to the upcoming release is no longer a supported option -- if you see a commit messages similar to this one (which marked the transition to 7.7-current), it's already too late.

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For -current or snapshots, syspatch is not really relevant anymore. Instead you run the sysupgrade command with the -s flag:

$ doas sysupgrade -s

The command runs much like it would for -stable versions, but with a slightly elevated risk of needing to run a manually supervised sysmerge after booting into the upgraded system.

New snapshots are generally accompanied (or followed soon after) by updated packages, and running pkg_add -u after a successful sysupgrade -s generally makes sense.

Some of the debugging related pkg_add flags make more sense in a snapshot environment.

It is worth noting that for the brief period when -current reports a release equivalent version string (one without -current or -beta suffix) it is necessary to add the -D snap to the pkg_add arguments is necessary in order update packages.

If you intend to contribute in any way, including testing, it is essentially required that you read the tech@ and bugs@ mailing lists and familiarize yourself with how to interact on those forums before posting.

The Way Forward

Hopefully this piece will clear up any confusion caused by me reposting recently the two pieces Keeping Your OpenBSD System In Trim: A Works For Me Guide for some background -- also available tracked and prettified and You've Installed It. Now What? Packages!, also available prettified and tracked here, which by now are more than a decade old.

The pieces still contain mostly correct reference information, but informed readers will notice that they predate the introduction of syspatch and the availability of updated packages for -stable available via pkg_add -u.

Please keep in mind that our favorite operating system OpenBSD is in constant and rapid developement, and that anything written about that system could be quite out of date even a few years from now. I hope to revisit this and other pieces to keep them reasonably in line with evolving realities. I welcome your comments and corrections via email or other channels such as whatever social medium brought you the link to this article.

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Note: Updated several times, last on 2025-04-28 to mark the OpenBSD 7.7 release.

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Resources For Further Reading

The OpenBSD FAQ

Michael W Lucas: Absolute OpenBSD, 2nd edition

Ted Unangst: doas Mastery

OpenBSD Journal News items about OpenBSD, generally short with references to material elsewhere.

Peter Hansteen: What every IT person needs to know about OpenBSD Part 1: How it all started,
What every IT person needs to know about OpenBSD Part 2: Why use OpenBSD?,
What every IT person needs to know about OpenBSD Part 3: That packet filter
(or the whole shebang in the raw here or with trackers at bsdly.blogspot.com)

Network Management with the OpenBSD Packet Filter toolset, by Peter N. M. Hansteen, Massimiliano Stucchi and Tom Smyth (A PF tutorial, this is the BSDCan 2024 edition). An earlier, even more extensive set of slides can be found in the 2016-vintage PF tutorial.

That Grumpy BSD Guy Blog posts by Peter N. M. Hansteen (prettified, tracked). New entries as well as still-relevant pieces that started out over there and have warranted updating will also be findable, untracked other than my webserver log, at https://nxdomain.no/~peter/blogposts/. Please let me know if there are pieces you think would warrant liberation to that space.

Fun Facts About the April 2024 Cisco Attack Data

A commendable attack data dump, lightly analyzed.

In the morning hours (CEST) of April 17, 2024, I found in my social media stream a reference to an Ars Technica article titled UNDER SIEGE — Attackers are pummeling networks around the world with millions of login attempts.

NOTE: A version without trackers but “classical” formatting is available here.

Articles about recent or ongoing attacks are not uncommon, but this time I was delighted to see that the report included a link to the actual data, provided by Cisco subsidiary Talos Intelligence.

When I downloaded the data approximately 09:15 CEST, the data consisted of

5243 unique IP addresses
2105 unique user names
71 unique passwords

I was initially a bit annoyed that the each group of data had apparently not been sorted, so I was a bit worried about possible duplicate entries, but closer inspection showed that I had not needed to worry.

Returning readers will be aware that at nxdomain.no (aka bsdly.net) we have been collecting data on attacks and attackers for some time already, as described in Badness, Enumerated by Robots (also available with nicer formatting but with trackers here) and various material linked from that article.

So naturally my impulse was to see whether there was any overlap between the data Cisco provided and the data collected here.

A few quick rounds for sorting and diffing (or very close equivalents), the results were clear:

of the 5243 unique IP addresses, none were in the currently trapped ssh bruteforcers set or the historical pop3 gropers set.
of the 2105 unique user names, a total of 1595 were not already included in the existing spamtraps list

of the 71 unique passwords, 34 or almost half of the total were not already in the spamtraps list.

If the last item made you chuckle, I am not surprised. But I have also observed at various times that bot herders (or possibly bot feeders) have managed to feed the data the wrong way around to their charges.

The biggest surprise here is that there was no overlap in hosts participating in the campaign against the Cisco customers and hosts that had participated in password guessing against my (for all practical purposes) honeypot system.

One possible explanation could be that the attackers here were targeting only specific products, possibly based on previous intelligence gathering. An alternative explanation could be that they were specifically avoiding certain hosts, such as those running the rather security oriented operating system OpenBSD that we use at this site.

The overlap in user names and passwords mistakenly used as user names with previously collected data here is less surprising.

After this very lightweight analysis, I went to the next logical step and added the offending IP addresses to the bruteforcers list and appended a @bsdly.net suffix to the user names and passwords, and added them to the spamtraps list.

I would like to thank Cisco-Talos for sharing the data on this incident freely.

If you found this article useful, interesting or even annoying, I would like to hear from you.

Good night and good luck.

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NOTE: If you follow the references in the various other articles, please keep in mind that the command examples there were written from an OpenBSD perspective. Details of command syntax may be different from the implementations on other Unixlikes.

Three Minimalist spamd Configurations for Your Spam Fighting Needs (With Bonus Points at the End)

Peter N. M. Hansteen

Making life harder for spammers does not necessarily require a lot of effort, if done correctly. Here are a few suggestions for how to use your spamd(8) on an OpenBSD or FreeBSD system that require minimal input but can yield noticeable gains.

Doing your bit to protect your own users and others agains scams, phising or other undesirable mail activity is good netizenship, but unfortunately there is a tendency to think that contributing in any way takes a lot of effort in addition to deep insight into all matters technical and social.

This piece is intended to give you, an aspiring or experienced OpenBSD or FreeBSD user who do not necessarily run a mail service yourself, a taste of some of the options available to you even if you do not want to expend too much effort.

Note: This piece is also available without trackers only basic formatting here.

If your system runs OpenBSD, you only need to enable spamd (overriding the NO defaults from /etc/rc.conf) by adding the following lines to your /etc/rc.conf.local:

spamd_flags=""
spamdlogd_flags=""


And adding the required lines to your pf.conf, cut-and-pasteable from the man page before reloading your ruleset. You may want to look into filling in actual flags later if your setup requires it.

If your system runs FreeBSD, you need to enable PF, install the spamd package, then run through the steps outlined in the package message which is displayed at the end of the package installation.

With those preliminaries out of the way, we can go on to the specifics of each of the low effort scenarios.

Classic imported blacklist-only

When spamd(8) was first introduced, it did only one thing: slow down incoming SMTP traffic from known bad sources. The known bad addresses were the ones fetched from address lists generated locally or elsewhere, as specified in spamd.conf.

The pure blacklisting mode is still available. If you have one or more sources of blocklists that you consider reliable, you can use those. To enable this mode on OpenBSD, add the line

spamd_black=YES

to /etc/rc.conf.local or add the -b flag to any options in the spamd_flags= variable, edit in any lists to fetch in your spamd.conf, restart spamd and add a crontab entry to run spamd-setup at reasonable intervals.

On FreeBSD, the procedure is basically the same, but adding the -b flag to the spamd_flags= variable is the only way to enable the feature.

Once you have the -b mode enabled, any SMTP traffic from the known bad hosts will be stuttered at -- answers arriving at a rate of one byte per second until they give up, and spamd-setup will refresh your lists at the intervals you have specified.

You can then sit back and enjoy the feeling of getting to waste spammers' (or at least spambots') time.

Checking your system logs for spamd log entries occasionally will likely lead to giggles.

Classic greylisting without imported lists

The original version of spamd(8) did not know how to do greylisting, but since the version that shipped with OpenBSD 4.1, greylisting mode is the default mode.

If you simply enable spamd without touching any other options, you will have greylisting enabled.

This means that any SMTP traffic from hosts that have not previously contacted your spamd will be stuttered at (one byte at the time, remember) for ten seconds at first.

If they come back within a reasonable time, they will be added to the allowable list. If you have a real mail server in the back somewhere, the traffic will eventually be let through.

Once set up, this mode is also extremely low maintenance.

After a while, your system logs may offer some occasional entertainment.

Allowed domains only

If you're still reading this article, you more likely than not have at least heard about the greytrapping concept. I have written about the concept and practice at length (see the reading materials at the end), and it is one of the topics that I sense is generally perceived as being complicated and labor intensive.

I am here to tell you that there is in fact an easy, low maintenance way in to greytrapping, by making allowed domains be the only criterion for trapping and blocking. This is the method I described in more detail in the previous article A Simpler Life: Trapping Spambots Based on Target Domain Only (or with nicer formatting and Big G's trackers here).

Simply put, if you are running your spamd in the default greylisting mode, with or without imported blocklists, you can tiptoe into greytrapping by adding the domains you want to receive mail for to your spamd.alloweddomains file. If you want to disallow subdomains of otherwise wanted domains, you add an entry with the otherwise wanted domain with an @ at sign prepended.

Make the configuration changes specified in the article. Do read the man pages and other relevant references, the article has quite a few links.

Once you have input the wanted domains in your spamd.alloweddomains file and reloaded your spamd service, any attempt at delivery to any domain that is not specificed in your configuration will lead to blocklisting and subsquent stuttering until the sender gives up.

With this minimal trapping configuration in place, your logs will soon offer some excellent entertainment. Such as this, which demonstrates that I do not own that domain and do not want to receive or relay mail from elsewhere to it:

Jan 25 16:29:14 skapet spamd[84681]: (GREY) 185.196.10.236: <htg@dataped.no> -> <captainjohnwhite3@gmail.com>
Jan 25 16:29:14 skapet spamd[4259]: Trapping 185.196.10.236 for tuple 185.196.10.236 tTzhEgT <htg@dataped.no> <captainjohnwhite3@gmail.com>
Jan 25 16:29:14 skapet spamd[4259]: new greytrap entry 185.196.10.236 from <htg@dataped.no> to <captainjohnwhite3@gmail.com>, helo tTzhEgT


Bonus tracks: The MX-less merry prankster, and more

All of the things mentioned here will work equally well each on their own or in combination, and those things will, should you choose to go on to set up a mail service, ease the load considerably on the parts of your setup that does the heavier duty computing involved in mail delivery, the content filtering, either for match against known bad code (aka antivirus or antimalware) patterns or text patterns known to be part of scammy spam.

But one fun fact that one of my correspondents pointed out to me some years back is that you can run a spamd service with no real mail service available.

This correspondent reported that sure, they had an OpenBSD machine in an internet facing position, but did not run a mail service.

They set up a combination of the methods outlined earlier, but their mail was handled elsewhere. Anything that finally cleared the barriers of their spamd config would have nowhere to go.

The fact that they did not run an actual mail service did not stop spam senders for trying, and the setup proved ideal for testing how well spamd(8)'s -S and -s options worked.

Please check out the man page to see what they do.

And yes, the effect of -s seemed to be quite linear according to my correspondent's data.

If you want to go further, here is some reading material for you

I hope you find the previous entries informative and possibly even useful.

As you have seen, you can contribute to spam protection efforts even if you do not run an actual mail service. If any of the things suggested earlier suit your needs, enjoy!

However, if you are entertaining the idea of running your own mail service, I have some further reading that I suggest and recommend you spend some time digesting.

First, if you want to run a mail service, do yourself a favor and not only read the relevant man pages, but also sign up for the mailop mailing list, read the Mailop FAQ and the Best Practices for Servers document.

Please also do yourself the favor or lurking, or listening in a bit to get some idea of what kind of discussions are expected there, before posting yourself. Also, familiarize yourself with the mailing list archives. Your question may very well have been answered extensively and well in the past.

If you want to dig deeper in matters related to spam, greytrapping and the OpenBSD spamd(8) program in general, here are a few resources for you:

In The Name Of Sane Email: Setting Up OpenBSD's spamd(8) With Secondary MXes (also with trackers)

Badness, enumerated by robots (also with trackers)

Goodness, Enumerated by Robots. Or, Handling Those Who Do Not Play Well With Greylisting (also with trackers)

Maintaining A Publicly Available Blacklist (tracked only, sorry)

Effective Spam and Malware Countermeasures - Network Noise Reduction Using Free Tools (also tracked only, sorry)

The Book of PF, 3rd edition (now again available as physical copies).

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Thanks to Michael Lucas, who wrote a message on the mailop mailing list that spurred me to write both this article and the previous A Simpler Life: Trapping Spambots Based on Target Domain Only (or with nicer formatting and Big G's trackers here).