Subject: Your account was under attack! Change your credentials!
From: Melissa <chenbin@jw-hw.com>
To: adnan@bsdly.net
Hello!
I am a hacker who has access to your operating system.
I also have full access to your account.
I've been watching you for a few months now.
The fact is that you were infected with malware through an adult site that you visited.
Did you receive a message phrased more or less like that, which then went on to say that they have a video of you performing an embarrasing activity while visiting an "adult" site, which they will send to all your contacts unless you buy Bitcoin and send to a specific ID?
Note: This piece is also available, with more basic formatting but with no trackers, here.
Note: Due to a recent incident of fatfingering, some log file extracts and other data linked from this piece are no longer readily available. The data may still be partially restorable, and I will attempt to reconstruct data for valid research purposes if there is sufficient interest.
The good news is that the video does not exist. I know this, because neither does our friend Adnan here. Despite that fact, whoever operates the account presenting as Melissa appears to believe that Adnan is indeed a person who can be blackmailed. You're probably safe for now. I will provide more detail later in the article, but first a few
dos and
don'ts:
- Whatever some tempting web site tells you in a popup, unless you know what you are doing, do not install software on your devices from any other sources than the official ones. You do not need to install a new video viewer for that site or update your existing one, neither do you need to enter your administrator user name and password along with your credit card details into an unfamiliar-looking dialog box or web form.
- Unless you know what you are doing, stay away from Bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies. If that message is the first you've heard of Bitcoin, you do not know what you are doing, leave it alone. As assets go, there is not much difference between financial derivatives, toxic waste and cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, in that they should be handled with equal care and only from a distance unless you are in fact an expert in the field.
- If you are not sure about either of the two bullet points before this one, please forget any shame over what you may or may not have done, and contact somebody you trust and who knows the subject better. This may be an adult such as a parent, teacher, social worker or other, a tech-savvy friend, or for that matter law enforcement such as your local police.
The important point is that you are or were about to be the victim of what I consider a very obvious scam, and for no good or even nearly valid reason. You should not need to become the next victim.
And this, dear policy makers and tech heads in general is our problem: A large subset of the general public simply do not know their way around the digital world we created for them to live in. We need to do better.
In that context I find it quite disturbing that people who
should know better, such as the
Norwegian Center for Information Security, in a
recently issued report (also see
Digi.no's article (both in Norwegian only, sorry)) predict that the sextortion attacks will become "more sophisticated and credible". Then again at some level they may technically be right, since this kind of activity starts out with a net negative credibility score.
A case in point: Some versions of the scam messages I have been able to study went as far as to claim that the perpetrators had not only had taken control of the target's device, they had even sent that very email message from there. That never happened, of course, and it would have been easy for anybody who had learned to interpret
Received: headers to verify that the message was in fact sent from the great elsewhere. Unfortunately the skill of reading email headers is rarely, if ever, taught to ordinary users.
The fact that people do not understand those -- to techies -- obvious facts is a fairly central and burdening problem, and again we need to do better.
Now let me explain. Things get incrementally more technical from here, so if you came here only for the admonitions or practical advice and have no use for the background, feel free to wander off.
I know the message I quoted at the beginning here is a scam because I run my own mail service, and looking at just the logs there just now I see that since the last logs archiving rotation early Saturday morning, more than 3000 attempts at delivery of messages like the one for Adnan happened, aimed at approximately 200 non-existent recipients before my logs tell me they finally tried to deliver one to my primary contact address, never actually landing in any inboxes.
One of the techniques we use to weed out unwanted incoming mail is to maintain and
publish a list of known bad and invalid email addresses in our domains. These known bad addresses have then in ways unknown (at least not known to us in any detail) made it into the list of addresses sold to spammers, and we at the receiving end can use the bad addresses as triggers to block traffic from the sending hosts (If you are interested, you can read elsewhere
on this blog for details on how we do this, look for tags such as
greylisting,
greytrapping or
antispam).
If it was not clear earlier, those numbers tell us something about the messages at hand. It should be fairly obvious that compromising videos of non-existent users could not, in fact, exist.
Looking back in archived logs from the same system I see that a variant of this message started appearing in late January 2018. The specifics of that message sequence will be interesting to revisit when the full history of
sextortion (I still do not like the term, but my preferred alterantive is at risk of being filtered out by polite society-serving robots) will be written, but let us rather turn to the more recent data, as in data recorded earlier this week.
Mainly because I found the media coverage of the "sextortion" phenomenon generally uninformed and somewhat annoying, I had been been mulling writing an article about it for a while, but I was still looking for a productive angle when on Wednesday evening I noticed a slight swelling in the number of greytrapped hosts. A glance at my
spamd log seemed to indicate that at least one of the delivery attempts had a line like
I am a hacker who has access to your operating system.
Which was actually just what I had been pondering writing about.
So I set about for a little research. I
greped (searched) in my yet-un
rotated
spamd logs for the word
hacker, which yielded lots of lines of the type
Feb 22 04:04:35 skapet spamd[8716]: 89.22.104.47: Body: I am a hacker who has access to your operating system.
Feb 22 04:17:04 skapet spamd[8716]: 5.79.23.92: Body: I am a hacker who has access to your operating system.
Feb 22 04:34:03 skapet spamd[8716]: 153.120.146.199: Body: I am a hacker who has access to your operating system.
Feb 22 04:40:30 skapet spamd[8716]: 45.181.93.45: Body: I am a hacker who has access to your operating system.
Feb 22 04:55:04 skapet spamd[8716]: 93.186.247.18: Body: I am a hacker who has access to your operating system.
Feb 22 05:09:39 skapet spamd[8716]: 123.51.190.154: Body: I am a hacker who has access to your operating system.
Feb 22 05:13:22 skapet spamd[8716]: 212.52.131.4: Body: I am a hacker who has access to your operating system.
Feb 22 05:38:02 skapet spamd[8716]: 5.79.23.92: Body: I am a hacker who has access to your operating system.
Feb 22 05:44:39 skapet spamd[8716]: 123.51.190.154: Body: I am a hacker who has access to your operating system.
Feb 22 06:00:30 skapet spamd[8716]: 45.181.93.45: Body: I am a hacker who has access to your operating system.
(the full result has been preserved
here). Extracting the source addresses gave a list of 198 IP addresses (preserved
here).
Extracting the
To: addresses from the fuller listing yielded 192 unique email addresses (preserved
here). Looking at the extracted target email addresses yielded some interesting insights:
1) The target email addresses were not exclusively in the domains my system actually serves, and
2) Some ways down the list of target email addresses, my own primary address turns up.
Of course 2) made me look a little closer, and only one IP address in the extract had tried delivery to my email address.
A further
grep on that IP address turned up
this result.
There are really no surprises to be had here, at least to a large subset of my supposed readers. The sender had first tried to deliver one of the sexstortion video messages to one of the by now more than quarter million
spamtraps, and its IP address was still blacklisted by the time it finally tried delivery to a potentially deliverable address.
Doing a few spot checks on the sender IP addresses in recent and less recent logs it looks like the only two things could be mildly exciting about those messages. One is the degree the content was intended to be embarrasing to the recipient. The other is a possible indicator of the campaign's success: Looking back through the logs for the approximate year of known activity, it even looks like the campaign became multilingual, while retaining the word "
hacker" in most if (possibly) not all language versions.
Other than that it is almost depressing how normal the sextortion campaign is: It uses the
same spam sending infrastructure and the
same low quality target address lists (the ones containing some subset of my
spamtrap addresses) as the regular and likely not too successful spammers of every stripe. Nothing else stands out.
And as returning readers will notice, the logs indicate that the spambots are naive enough in their SMTP code that they frequently mistake spamd's delaying tactics for a slow, but functional open SMTP relay.
Now to recap the main points:
- Regular users: The sextortion messages are scams, the videos do not exist. If this quasi-random sample is representative, the scammers are seen to send to 200 non-existing, invalid addresses before lucking on a real one. This alone strongly indicates that no videos exist. There is no reason to send money, bitcoin or otherwise. Look instead to learning how your devices and the networks and services they connect to actually work.
- Competent mail admins: The tools to stop the flow of sextortion messages or at least slow to a manageable trickle are available today. You simply need to keep your antispam game up to speed with best practices and best of breed tools. If you are a user or someone who manages mail admins, check what your mail service does.
- Competent authorities: Please step up to the task of educating the public. Sane, fact based approaches to IT security work. While it is easy to get distracted by the potential presence of porn and users' feelings of shame over accessing that kind of material, assigning much weight to that side of the matter is counterproductive. Work to educate the public and please focus on real threats, not imagined ones like the present topic.
Whatever evolves next out of these rather hamfisted attempts at blackmail is unlikely to ever achieve any level of sophistication worthy of the name.
We would all be much better served by focusing on real threats such as, but not limited to, credential harvesting via deceptive content delivered over advertising networks, which themselves are a major headache security- and privacy-wise, or even harvesting via phishing email.
Both of the latter have been known to lead to successful compromise with data exfiltration and identity theft as possible-to-probable results.
To a large extent the damage could could have been significantly limited had the general public been taught sensible security practices such as using multi-factor authentication or at least actually good passwords combined with securely coded password management applications, and insisting that services encourage such practices.
Yes, I know you have been dying to ask: What is the thing about Adnan? According to my activity log, the address
adnan@bsdly.net was added as a spamtrap on July 8th, 2017 after somebot had tried to log on as the user
adnan, a user name not seen before at
bsdly.net,
Jul 8 09:40:34 skapet sshd[34794]: Failed password for invalid user adnan from 118.217.181.8 port 41091 ssh2
apparently from a network in South Korea.
As always, there is more log material available to competent practitioners and researchers with a valid research agenda. Please contact me if you are such a person who could use the collected data productively.
Update 2020-02-29: For completeness and because I felt that an unsophisticated attack like the present one deserves a thorough if unsophisticated analysis, I decided to take a look at the log data for the entire 7 day period, post-rotation.
So here comes some armchair analysis, using only the tools you will find in the base system of your OpenBSD machine or any other running a sensibly stocked unix-like operating systen. We start with finding the total number of delivery attempts logged where we have the body text 'am a hacker' (this would show up only after a sender has been blacklisted, so the gross number actual delivery attempts will likely be a tad higher), with the command
zgrep "am a hacker" /var/log/spamd.0.gz | awk '{print $6}' | wc -l
which tells us the number is 3372.
Next up we use a variation of the same command to extract the source IP addresses of the log entries that contain the string 'am a hacker', sort the result while also removing duplicates and store the end result in an environment variable called lastweek:
export lastweek=`zgrep "am a hacker" /var/log/spamd.0.gz | awk '{print $6}' | tr -d ':' | sort -u `
With our list of IP addresses tucked away in the environment variable go on to: For each IP address in our lastweek set, extract all log entries and store the result (still in crude sort order by IP address), in the file 2020-02-29_i_am_hacker.raw.txt:
for foo in $lastweek ; do zgrep $foo /var/log/spamd.0.gz | tee -a 2020-02-09_i_am_hacker.raw.txt ; done
For reference I kept the list of unique IP addresses (now totalling 231) around too.
Next, we are interested in extracting the target email addresses, so the command
grep "To:" 2020-02-29_i_am_hacker.raw.txt | awk '{print substr($0,index($0,$8))}' | sort -u
finds the lines in our original extract containing "To:", and gives us the list of target addresses the sources in our data set tried to deliver mail to.
The result is preserved as 2020-02-29_i_am_hacker.raw_targets.txt, a total of 236 addresses, mostly but not all in domains we actually host here. One surprise was that among the target addresses one actually invalid address turned up that was not at that time yet a spamtrap. See the end of the activity log for details (it also turned out to be the last SMTP entry in that log for 2020-02-29).
This little round of armchair analysis on the static data set confirms the conclusions from the original article: Apart from the possibly titillating aspects of the "adult" web site mentions and the attempt at playing on the target's potential shamefulness over specific actions, as spam campaigns go, this one is ordinary to the point of being a bit boring.
There may well be other actors preying on higher-value targets through their online clumsiness and known peculiarities of taste in an actually targeted fashion, but this is not it.
A final note on tools: In this article, like all previous entries, I have exclusively used the tools you will find in the OpenBSD (or other sensibly put together unixlike operating system) base system or at a stretch as an easily available package.
For the simpler, preliminary investigations and poking around like we have done here, the basic tools in the base system are fine. But if you will be performing log analysis at scale or with any regularity for purposes that influences your career path, I would encourage you to look into setting up a proper, purpose-built log analysis system.
Several good options, open source and otherwise, are available. I will not recommend or endorse any specific one, but when you find one that fits your needs and working style you will find that after the initial setup and learning period it will save you significant time.
As per my practice, only material directly relevant to the article itself has been published via the links. If you are a professional practitioner or researcher with who can state a valid reason to need access to unpublished material, please let me know and we will discuss your project.
Update 2020-03-02: I knew I had some early samples of messages that did make it to an inbox near me squirreled away somewhere, and after a bit of rummaging I found them, stored here (note the directory name, it seemed so obvious and transparent even back then). It appears that the oldest intact messages I have are from December 2018. I am sure earlier examples can be found if we look a littler harder.
Update 2020-03-17: A fresh example turned up this morning, addressed to (of all things) the postmaster account of one of our associated .no domains, written in Norwegian (and apparently generated with Microsoft Office software). The preserved message can be downloaded here.
Update 2020-05-10: While rummaging about (aka 'researching') for something else I noticed that spamd logs were showing delivery attempts for messages with the subject "High level of danger. Your account was under attack." So out of idle curiosity on an early Sunday afternoon, I did the following:
$ export muggles=`grep " High level of danger." /var/log/spamd | awk '{print $6}' | tr -d ':' | sort -u`
$ for foo in $muggles; do grep $foo /var/log/spamd >>20200510-muggles ; done
and the result is preserved for your entertainment and/or enlightenment here. Not much to see, really other than that they sent the message in two language varieties, and to a small subset of our imaginary friends.
Update 2020-08-13: Here is another snapshot of activity from August 12 and 13: this file preserves the activity of 19 different hosts, and as we can see that since they targeted our imaginary friends first, it is unlikely they reached any inboxes here. Some of these campaigns may have managed to reach users elsewhere, though
Update 2020-09-06: Occasionally these messages manage to hit a mailbox here. Apparently enough Norwegians fall for these scams that Norwegian language versions (not terribly well worded) get aimed at users here. This example, aimed at what has only ever been an email alias made it here, slipping through by a stroke of luck during a time that IP address was briefly not in the spamd-greytrap list here, as can be seen from this log excerpt. It is also worth noting that an identically phrased message was sent from another IP address to mailer-daemon@ for one of the domains we run here.
Update 2021-01-06: For some reason, a new variant turned up here today (with a second message a few minutes later and then a third), addressed to a generic contact address here. A very quick check of logs here only turned up only this indication of anything similar (based on a search for the variant spelling PRONOGRAPHIC), but feel free to check your own logs based on these samples if you like.
Update 2021-01-16: One more round, this for my Swedish alter ego. Apparently sent from a poorly secured Vietnamese system.
Update 2021-01-18: A Norwegian version has surfaced, attempted sent to approximately 115 addresses in .no domains we handle, fortunately the majority of the addresses targeted were in fact spamtraps, as this log extract shows.
Update 2021-03-03: After a few quiet weeks, another campaign started swelling our greytrapped hosts collection, as this hourly count of IP addresses in the traplist at dump to file time shows:
Tue Mar 2 21:10:01 CET 2021 : 2425
Tue Mar 2 22:10:01 CET 2021 : 4014
Tue Mar 2 23:10:01 CET 2021 : 4685
Wed Mar 3 00:10:01 CET 2021 : 4847
Wed Mar 3 01:10:01 CET 2021 : 5759
Wed Mar 3 02:10:01 CET 2021 : 6560
Wed Mar 3 03:10:01 CET 2021 : 6774
Wed Mar 3 04:10:01 CET 2021 : 7997
Wed Mar 3 05:10:01 CET 2021 : 8231
Wed Mar 3 06:10:01 CET 2021 : 8499
Wed Mar 3 07:10:01 CET 2021 : 9910
Wed Mar 3 08:10:01 CET 2021 : 10240
Wed Mar 3 09:10:01 CET 2021 : 11872
Wed Mar 3 10:10:01 CET 2021 : 12255
Wed Mar 3 11:10:01 CET 2021 : 13689
Wed Mar 3 12:10:01 CET 2021 : 14181
Wed Mar 3 13:10:01 CET 2021 : 15259
Wed Mar 3 14:10:01 CET 2021 : 15881
Wed Mar 3 15:10:02 CET 2021 : 17061
Wed Mar 3 16:10:01 CET 2021 : 17625
Wed Mar 3 17:10:01 CET 2021 : 18758
Wed Mar 3 18:10:01 CET 2021 : 19170
Wed Mar 3 19:10:01 CET 2021 : 20028
Wed Mar 3 20:10:01 CET 2021 : 20578
Wed Mar 3 21:10:01 CET 2021 : 20997
and they attempted to get to
mailer-daemon@, as can be seen from
this preserved message as well as
this one (both of which actually did inbox due to
aliases).
Stay safe out there.
Update 2021-04-17: A new variant, somewhat crudely worded, inboxed today. Preserved
here,
here and
here.
Update 2021-05-15: After swelling the list of trapped hosts considerably over the last few days, a sample of the campaign with the most correctly worded Norwegian text
inboxed today, and I later found
other samples.
From the logs it looks like the campaign started on May 13th:
Thu May 13 10:10:01 CEST 2021 : 3998
Thu May 13 11:10:01 CEST 2021 : 4064
Thu May 13 12:10:01 CEST 2021 : 7052
Thu May 13 13:10:01 CEST 2021 : 7297
Thu May 13 14:10:01 CEST 2021 : 7474
Thu May 13 15:10:01 CEST 2021 : 10178
Thu May 13 16:10:01 CEST 2021 : 10251
Thu May 13 17:10:01 CEST 2021 : 11150
Thu May 13 18:10:01 CEST 2021 : 12686
Thu May 13 19:10:01 CEST 2021 : 12866
Thu May 13 20:10:01 CEST 2021 : 14708
Thu May 13 21:10:01 CEST 2021 : 14713
Thu May 13 22:10:01 CEST 2021 : 14907
Thu May 13 23:10:02 CEST 2021 : 16336
Fri May 14 00:10:01 CEST 2021 : 16360
Fri May 14 01:10:01 CEST 2021 : 16473
Fri May 14 02:10:01 CEST 2021 : 17608
Fri May 14 03:10:01 CEST 2021 : 17643
Fri May 14 04:10:01 CEST 2021 : 17671
Fri May 14 05:10:01 CEST 2021 : 17763
Fri May 14 06:10:01 CEST 2021 : 18796
Fri May 14 07:10:01 CEST 2021 : 18950
Fri May 14 08:10:02 CEST 2021 : 18972
Fri May 14 09:10:01 CEST 2021 : 18725
Fri May 14 10:10:01 CEST 2021 : 19929
Fri May 14 11:10:01 CEST 2021 : 19942
Fri May 14 12:10:01 CEST 2021 : 17046
Fri May 14 13:10:01 CEST 2021 : 18068
Fri May 14 14:10:01 CEST 2021 : 18619
Fri May 14 15:10:01 CEST 2021 : 16066
Fri May 14 16:10:01 CEST 2021 : 17468
Fri May 14 17:10:01 CEST 2021 : 17297
Fri May 14 18:10:01 CEST 2021 : 15859
Fri May 14 19:10:01 CEST 2021 : 17395
Fri May 14 20:10:01 CEST 2021 : 15934
Fri May 14 21:10:01 CEST 2021 : 15996
Fri May 14 22:10:01 CEST 2021 : 17120
Fri May 14 23:10:02 CEST 2021 : 16238
Sat May 15 00:10:01 CEST 2021 : 16299
Sat May 15 01:10:01 CEST 2021 : 16362
Sat May 15 02:10:01 CEST 2021 : 16346
Sat May 15 03:10:01 CEST 2021 : 16814
Sat May 15 04:10:01 CEST 2021 : 16812
Sat May 15 05:10:01 CEST 2021 : 16787
Sat May 15 06:10:01 CEST 2021 : 16007
Sat May 15 07:10:01 CEST 2021 : 17093
Sat May 15 08:10:01 CEST 2021 : 17101
Sat May 15 09:10:01 CEST 2021 : 17015
Sat May 15 10:10:01 CEST 2021 : 15702
Sat May 15 11:10:01 CEST 2021 : 15637
Update 2021-06-16: Another campaign seems to be under way, with
this message sent to an address which I can reveal is simply an alias.
Update 2021-08-16: Thanks to one particular operator being 'too big to block'
this message, apparently part of a campaign that has at least 103 other sending hosts that are currently trapped here, actually inboxed despite being sent to a spamtrap which also corresponded to a forgotten alias for an actual in-use mailbox.
Update 2021-08-17: By lunchtime the output of
grep vellykket /var/log/spamd | awk '{ print $6 }' | sort -u | tr -d ':' | wc -l
had reached 471, so I did
export trash=`grep vellykket /var/log/spamd | awk '{ print $6 }' | sort -u | tr -d ':'`
for foo in $trash ; do grep $foo /var/log/spamd >> vellykket.txt ; done
You can find the result here:
vellykket_20210817T1200.txt. It looks like the campaign is still in progress.
A few hours later, the number was 570 and the new export looks like
vellykket.txt while the most up to date list of IP addresses participating in the campaign is in
vellykke_addressest.txt
If you're interested in further data, please let me know.
Update 2021-09-09: There are signs that another campaign is in progress, with an inboxed sample preserved
here. This particular message appears to have been delivered from a Korean network.
Update 2021-10-27: Another
sample inboxed overnight, from a campaign that uses a text with only slight edits from eariler.
Update 2021-11-29: Overnight a collection of trimmed-down messages like
this one appeared, claiming to have installed a trojan on the supposed victim's phone, but asking the victim to answer the message for further instruction. An attempt to weed out spamtraps from their address lists, perhaps?
Update 2022-02-02: Another campaign is underway, a sample has been preserved
here. It makes the usual claims of device takeover. This particular message seems to have been delivered via a Kenyan system.
Update 2022-03-30: A
new entry appeared today, with only minor variations relative to earlier campaigns. As expected a log extract
shows that the same host had been used in some spamming campaign or other -- possibly even an earlier segment of the same one -- only a few days ago.
Update 2022-04-08: The number of languages used in those messages received here grew by one with today's
entry, which seems to be in German. I am not qualified to speak to the quality or lack of same of the translation, but I note that the host that was used to send the message seems to belong in an Indonesian network.
Update 2022-04-09: Yet
another German language entry, this on also sent from a system apparently in Indonesia.
Update 2022-08-19: A new Norwegian language campaign is under way, with a handful of new samples available in the
archive.
Update 2022-09-18: Another campaign in progress, this time picking up on quasi-recent buzzwords. I offer
the evidence so far.
U
pdate 2022-09-24: Yet another campaign, very similar to the last one. This
message was apparently sent from a (likely compromised) Kuwaiti system.
Update 2022-10-06: Here we go again. The campaign has been going on for a little while, the first message to inbox (sort of) was
this one, apparently delivered from a host located in Korea. The list of identified spam sources (246 hosts at this point) is
here, while a log of activity can be found
here.
Warning: that last one is
not a small file.
If you have further data on these or similar incidents that you are able to share or if you want to look further into these and similar incidents, please let me know.
If you find any errors in the material I publish or disagree with my sentiments, or if you find this article interesting, useful or annoying, please let me know, either in comments or via email.
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